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Artificial-Noise-Aided Physical Layer Phase
Challenge-Response Authentication for
Practical OFDM Transmission
Xiaofu Wu, Zhen Yang, Cong Ling, and Xiang-Gen Xia
Abstract
Recently, we have developed a PHYsical layer Phase Challenge-Response Authentication Scheme
(PHY-PCRAS) for independent multicarrier transmission. In this paper, we make a further step by
proposing a novel artificial-noise-aided PHY-PCRAS (ANA-PHY-PCRAS) for practical orthogonal fre-
quency division multiplexing (OFDM) transmission, where the Tikhonov-distributed artificial noise
is introduced to interfere with the phase-modulated key for resisting potential key-recovery attacks
whenever a static channel between two legitimate users is unfortunately encountered. Then, we address
various practical issues for ANA-PHY-PCRAS with OFDM transmission, including correlation among
subchannels, imperfect carrier and timing recoveries. Among them, we show that the effect of sampling
offset is very significant and a search procedure in the frequency domain should be incorporated
for verification. With practical OFDM transmission, the number of uncorrelated subchannels is often
not sufficient. Hence, we employ a time-separated approach for allocating enough subchannels and a
modified ANA-PHY-PCRAS is proposed to alleviate the discontinuity of channel phase at far-separated
time slots. Finally, the key equivocation is derived for the worst case scenario. We conclude that the
enhanced security of ANA-PHY-PCRAS comes from the uncertainty of both the wireless channel
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2and introduced artificial noise, compared to the traditional challenge-response authentication scheme
implemented at the upper layer.
Index Terms
Authentication, physical layer authentication, OFDM transmission, information-theoretic security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring security of wireless communications has becoming increasingly important. Openness
of wireless networks makes them vulnerable to spoofing attacks where an unauthorized user
masquerades as another legitimate user. In the past, conventional cryptographic security mecha-
nisms were used to foil such attacks [1], in which the identity of a user should be authenticated
through a challenge-response process, namely, authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol.
The AKA protocol was revised [2] for stronger security from second-generation (2G) to fourth-
generation (4G) systems. A recent AKA protocol, known as Evolved Packet System AKA (EPS-
AKA) [3]–[5], has been proposed for the Long Term Evolution (LTE) system. The security of
state-of-the-art EPS-AKA protocol comes from computational complexity, namely, the adversary
has limited computational power. It is believed that more efforts should be done to prevent
potential innovative attacks since the wireless medium offers novel avenues for intrusion.
In recent years, various efforts [6]–[15] have been made in authenticating the transmitter
and receiver at the physical layer. In general, these physical layer authentication schemes can
be classified as key based or keyless, according to whether a secret key shared between the
transmitter and receiver is exploited to authenticate each other or not. In the keyless authentication
schemes [10]–[15], some specific features of either the transmitting device or the specific channel
between the legitimate users were exploited in order to authenticate the transmission. As an
initial trusted transmission is often required for identifying the features, they might be difficult
to implement in some practical scenarios. Instead, various key based authentication schemes
[6]–[9] are closer to the traditional challenge-response mechanism, but less prone to attacks due
to the protection from the unique randomness of physical characteristics.
For key based challenge-response authentication schemes, two legitimate users, Alice and
Bob, shared a secret key. Whenever Alice transmits a random number as the challenge, Bob
sends back a response (often called a tag), which is the output of a cryptographic hash function
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3with both the challenge and key as its inputs. By verifying the response with a locally generated
tag, Bob’s identity can be confirmed. Indeed, both schemes in [6], [7] follow this authentication
mechanism, which are implemented at the physical layer. In [7], both Alice and Bob presume
public challenges, which are used to generate tags with the shared key, and the tag is physically
encapsulated as an embedded fingerprint, which is conveyed with the primary transmission by
superposition. The embedded fingerprint is often allocated with low power, which is further
corrupted by the channel noise. Hence, its recovery is in general difficult for the adversary,
as she/he faces a fundamental information-theoretic challenge, not purely a computational one.
The PHYsical layer Challenge-Response Authentication Mechanism (PHY-CRAM) proposed
in [6] implements the conventional challenge-response process at the physical layer, where
the randomness of fading channel’s amplitude is used to protect both challenge and response
(tag). Recently, we proposed a PHYsical layer Phase Challenge-Response Authentication Scheme
(PHY-PCRAS) for multicarrier transmission in [16]. It requires the channel reciprocity and the
randomness of channel-phase response [17] for the protection of the shared key from possible
eavesdropping.
By exploiting the randomness of physical channels, various physical layer authentication
schemes may ensure unconditional security at least for some bits of the shared key (which
cannot be broken even if the adversary has unlimited computational power). However, this
enhanced security depends heavily on the underlying physical channel, which is often out of
our control. In the worst case of static channels (for example, line-of-sight communications),
this kind of unconditional security may not be guaranteed. In this paper, we consider to develop
an improved version of PHY-PCRAS for practical OFDM transmission, which can guarantee
enhanced security even in the worst case of static channels.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) We propose a novel artificial-noise-aided PHY-PCRAS (ANA-PHY-PCRAS) for practical
OFDM transmission, where the Tikhonov-distributed artificial noise is introduced to in-
terfere with the phase-modulated key for resisting possible attacks. A strictly-positive key
equivocation can be ensured even for the worst case scenario.
2) We make a fine improvement on PHY-PCRAS [16], where the estimate of phase differences
between subcarriers is simply replaced by the direct estimate of subcarrier phases. This
makes the implementation of PHY-PCRAS simpler.
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43) A time-separated subchannel allocation scheme is provided to obtain a sufficient number
of uncorrelated subchannels. Then, a modified ANA-PHY-PCRAS is proposed for use of
time-separated subchannels, which shows its robustness in verification for alleviating the
discontinuity of channel phase at far-separated time slots.
4) Various practical issues are discussed with non-ideal OFDM transmission, including im-
perfect carrier and timing recoveries. In particular, we show that small sampling offsets
often result in significant frequency offsets along the allocated subcarriers, which should
be compensated for proper verification.
5) We also provide an application model for generating the shared keys between two legitimate
nodes in 4G mobile networks. Hence, the conventional challenge-response authentication
scheme employed in 4G networks might be replaced by ANA-PHY-PCRAS with enhanced
security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we propose an ANA-PHY-PCRAS
for perfect OFDM transmission, and a time-separated subchannel allocation scheme is presented,
along with a modified ANA-PHY-PCRAS. Section-III is devoted to practical issues with non-
ideal OFDM transmission. The security analysis of ANA-PHY-PCRAS is given in Sectiion-IV.
Simulation results are presented in Section-V, and the conclusion is made in Section-VI.
II. ANA-PHY-PCRAS FOR PERFECT OFDM TRANSMISSION
In this paper, we employ a common Alice-Bob-Eve model, where two trusting parties, Alice
and Bob, share some common secrets and they want to authenticate each other, while Eve, as
an opponent, has no any knowledge about the shared secrets and wants to impersonate Alice or
Bob.
From the viewpoint of modern cryptography, the development of cryptographic primitives
should consider the worst case scenario. In the past, various physical layer authentication schemes
were proposed and claimed enhanced security of information-theoretic nature, which, however,
depends heavily on the randomness of the underlying physical channel. Whenever the physical
channel happens to be static, there is simply no guarantee of enhanced security. Therefore, it
is essential to consider the worst case of static channels between Alice and Bob for developing
physical layer authentication schemes.
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5A. Basic Idea of ANA-PHY-PCRAS
We propose a novel ANA-PHY-PCRAS for OFDM transmission, which makes two nontrivial
improvements on PHY-PCRAS [16].
Firstly, channel uncertainty has been proved to be essential for ensuring enhanced security
in various physical layer cryptographic approaches. For ANA-PHY-PCRAS, we introduce the
Tikhonov-distributed artificial noise to interfere with the phase-modulated key, which could be
used to create artificial channel uncertainty. Therefore, the minimum amount of enhanced security
of information-theoretic nature can be guaranteed even in the worst case scenario. This contrasts
sharply to various reported physical layer authentication schemes, which rely solely on the
randomness of the physical channel. Whenever the channel randomness appears, ANA-PHY-
PCRAS can be protected by the uncertainty from both the physical channel and artificial noise.
Secondly, we make a fine improvement on PHY-PCRAS, where the estimate of phase differ-
ences between subcarriers is simply replaced by the direct estimate of subcarrier phase. It does
work as we use a noncoherent metric for verification, which remains unchanged for any random
but constant phase increment over all subcarriers.
B. Signal Model for Perfect OFDM Transmission
In this paper, we assume a multipath fading channel between Alice and Bob. It is often
associate with a channel coherence time Tc, below which the channel is considered as temporally
correlated.
Assuming an OFDM system with N subcarriers, a bandwidth of W Hz and symbol length
of Tf = Tu + Tg seconds, of which, Tg seconds are due to the length of cyclic prefix (CP), and
Tu = N/W . In the following, we use Ts = Tu/N = 1/W to denote the sampling period.
The transmitter uses the waveforms
uk(t) =


1√
Tu
ej2π
W
N
k(t−Tg), if t ∈ [0, Tf ]
0, otherwise
(1)
k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1 and the transmitted baseband for an OFDM symbol is
s(t) =
N−1∑
k=0
xkuk(t), (2)
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6where xk = ejϕk , k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1 are complex numbers from a signal constellation. Since
we focus on a phase challenge-response scheme, M-ary PSK modulation is preferred, and hence
ϕk ∈ Ω ,
{
0, 2π
M
, · · · , 2π(M−1)
M
}
.
The signal is transmitted over a frequency-selective fading channel
h(τ, t) =
∑
i
αi(t)δ(t− τi), (3)
where τi is the delay of the i-th path and αi(t) is the corresponding complex amplitude. Assuming
the receiver filter is flat within the signal bandwidth, the received signal is
r(t) =
∑
i
αi(t)s(t− τi) + w(t), (4)
where w(t) is an additive white Gaussian noise process.
Sampling the signal at time instants tn = nTs yields
r(tn) =
∑
i
αi(tn)s(tn − τi) + w(nTs). (5)
For convenience, assume that the delays τi’s are integer multiples of Ts. With the sampling
period of Ts = 1/W , the number of resulting samples for each OFDM symbol is Nf = N +Ng,
where Ng denotes the length of CP. After removing the guard interval and taking the fast Fourier
transform (FFT) to the received signal, we get
yk = hkxk + wk, k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, (6)
where yk =
∑
n rne
−j2π n
N
k with rn = r((n+Ng)Ts), and
hk , hk(tn) =
∑
i
αi(tn)e
−j2πk τi
Tu , (7)
which keeps constant at least over one OFDM symbol.
Let fc denote the carrier frequency at the 0th subcarrier. With perfect OFDM transmission, it
can be viewed as parallel multicarrier transmission with a set of carriers F = {fc, fc + WN , fc +
2W
N
, · · · , fc + (N − 1)WN }.
C. Subchannel Allocation for ANA-PHY-PCRAS
As a challenge-response process for ANA-PHY-PCRAS, Alice sends a challenge signal to
Bob, Bob sends back a response signal, which can be verified by Alice with the shared secret
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7key. With OFDM transmission, L < N subcarriers {f0, f1, · · · , fL−1} ⊂ F are selected. We shall
show later that the perfect security of ANA-PHY-PCRAS requires independent fading among L
carriers. Hence, these carriers should be well separated.
Let F = [0, N − 1] be the set of indexes for N subcarriers in F. To ensure independence
among L subchannels, one has to find a subset of indexes Ξ = {l0, l1, · · · , lL−1} ⊂ F (of size
L) with minimum mutual correlation, namely,
Ξ = arg min
Ξ⊂F ,|Ξ|=L
max
li 6=lj∈Ξ
|ρli,lj |, (8)
where
ρli,lj , E
[
hlih
∗
lj
]/√
E [|hli|2]E
[|hlj |2] (9)
since E[hli ] = 0, i ∈ [0, L− 1]. In practice, the allocated subchannels are often equally spaced,
and the value of ∆ℓ = li+1 − li determines the minimum mutual correlation.
1) Channel model with exponentially decaying power-delay profile: Consider a time-invariant
version of the multipath fading channel model (3), where αi’s are zero-mean complex Gaussian
variables with a power delay profile θ(τ˙i) and τ˙i , τiTs . The normalized delays τ˙i’s are assumed
to be uniformly and independently distributed over the length of CP (τ˙i ∈ [0, Ng]), and an
exponentially decaying power-delay profile takes the form of θ(τ˙i) = e−τ˙i/τ˙rms . With this channel
model, it was shown in [18] that the normalized correlation between subcarriers l1 and l2 is a
function of frequency separation ∆f = (l2 − l1)/N , which takes the form of
ρl1,l2 =
1− e−Ng(τ˙−1rms +2πj(l2−l1)/N)
τ˙rms(1− e−Ng τ˙−1rms )(τ˙−1rms + j2π(l2 − l1)/N)
. (10)
Scenario 1: Consider the scenario where the system operates with a bandwidth of W = 20
MHz, which is divided into N = 2048 tones with a total symbol period of 108.8 µs, of which
6.4 µs constitutes the CP. Hence, Ng = 128 and Nf = N +Ng = 2176.
Let στ be the time delay spread. For the Scenario 1 with στ = 0.5 µs, it gives that τ˙rms = 10,
and the frequency-spaced correlation function is plotted in Fig. 1.
2) Time-separated subchannel allocation: It has been shown that two subchannels could
be nearly uncorrelated if they are sufficiently separated, which, however, limits the number
of available subchannels for the purpose of physical layer authentication. Consider again the
Scenario 1. Whenever the allocated subchannels are equally separated with ∆ℓ = 128, there are
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Fig. 1. Frequency-spaced correlation function.
only L′ = 16+1 = 17 well-separated subchannels and the minimum mutual correlation is about
0.2468.
In [16], we have shown that the security of PHY-PCRAS depends on the number of indepen-
dent subchannels. With BPSK modulation, the size of shared key is equal to the number of inde-
pendent subchannels. Hence, it is important to allocate much more independent subchannels for
use in PHY-PCRAS. Fortunately, one can allocate more subchannels over sufficiently-separated
time slots (OFDM symbols).
The time-separated subchannel allocation scheme is shown in Fig. 2. With sufficiently-separated
carriers, there are only L′ carriers f0, f1, · · · , fL′−1 for use. However, one can repeatedly employ
such L′ carriers at times t0, t1, · · · , tJ−1, where tj = t0 + j · δT . To ensure independent fading
among different time slots, the minimum time interval between two neighboring time slots should
be significantly larger than the channel coherence time, namely, δT >> Tc.
Coherence time is the time duration over which the channel impulse response is considered
to be constant. Channel variation is mainly due to Doppler effects. Using Clarke’s model, the
coherence time is often selected as Tc =
√
9
16π
f−1D , where fD denotes the maximum Doppler
frequency. Consider now that the system operates at carrier frequency of 1.9 GHz. In typical
urban areas [19] with a mobile speed of 50 km/h, fD ≈ 88 Hz and Tc ≈ 4.8 ms.
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Fig. 2. Time-separated allocation of OFDM symbols for PHY-PCRAS.
With a challenge-response approach shown in Fig. 3, Alice starts the transmission of challenge
signal at time ta0, which arrives at Bob later at time ta0+ δt, where δt denotes the transmission
delay between Alice and Bob. Then, Bob sends back a response signal at time tb0. Define
∆tba = tb0 − ta0. Clearly, ∆tba > δt. PHY-PCRAS depends on the reciprocity of the channel
between Alice and Bob. It is understood that the channel keeps constant during the coherence
time Tc and hence the channel reciprocity requires that ∆tba < Tc − Tf , as shown in Fig. 2.
D. ANA-PHY-PCRAS
For ease of description, we first assume that all the allocated subchannels are from a single
OFDM symbol. Later, we shall present a modified ANA-PHY-PCRAS scheme for the time-
separated subchannels shown in Fig. 2. In what follows, we suppose that the shared keys between
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Fig. 3. ANA-PHY-PCRAS for OFDM transmission.
Alice and Bob are denoted as {KA,KB}, where each key can be considered as a sequence of
random bits.
1) PHY-Challenge: Consider that Alice wants to start a conversation with Bob as shown in
Fig. 3. Alice sends a “challenge” frame to Bob starting at time instant ta, which is employed by
Bob for estimation of channel phases at multiple carriers. Essentially, Alice sends equal-phase
modulated sinusoids (xk = 1, k = 0, 1, · · · , L − 1) at frequencies f0, f1, · · · , fL−1 during the
period of a single OFDM symbol t ∈ [ta, ta + Tf ], namely,
sA(t) =
L−1∑
k=0
ej(2πfkt+0), t ∈ [ta, ta + Tf ]. (11)
With perfect OFDM transmission, the waveforms ej(2πfkt) can be viewed as “mutually orthog-
onal” 1 at the receiver even they undergo multipath fading channels (after insertion and deletion
of the CP). Equivalently, the received signal at Bob can be represented as
rB(t) =
L−1∑
k=0
|hk|ej(2πfkt+θk) + w(t), t ∈ [ta + δt, ta + δt+ Tf ]. (12)
1Actually, they are only orthogonal in the discrete time domain, the continuous form is employed to show the time-related
issues for convenience.
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where hk =
∑
i αi(t)e
−j2πlk τiTu , lk ∈ Λ, k = 0, 1, · · · , L − 1 are assumed to be constant during
t ∈ [ta, ta + δt + Tf ], and ∠(hk) = θk are channel phase responses at L subcarriers. Hence, a
parallel fading channel model yBk = |hk|ejθk + wk, k = 0, 1, · · · , L− 1 is assumed with perfect
carrier and timing recoveries (please refer to (6)).
Then, Bob estimates the phase at each subcarrier fk, namely,
θˆk = ∠(y
B
k ) = θk +∆θˆk, k = 0, 1, · · · , L− 1. (13)
where ∆θˆk denotes the estimation error. Noting that we use the absolute channel phase estimates
θˆk while the estimates of channel phase differences are employed in PHY-PCRAS [16]. Compared
to PHY-PCRAS, the direct estimate of channel phase simplifies the implementation and its
robustness against the receiver oscillator remains unchanged as shown later.
2) PHY-Response: At this stage, Bob responds to Alice with a tagged signal, which encap-
sulates the shared key KB = [κ0, κ1, · · · , κL−1]T in the form of
sB(t) =
L−1∑
k=0
ej(2πfkt+ϕk−θˆk+υk), t ∈ [tb, tb + Tf ]. (14)
where ϕk = 2π κkM ∈ Ω, κk ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M−1} since we assume M-ary PSK modulation, and υk
denotes the introduced artificial noise. We assume that υk, k = 0, 1, · · · , L− 1 are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with the same probability-density-function (pdf) fυ(x). Here,
we employ the Tikhonov distribution for fυ(x), namely,
fυ(x) =
eβ cos(x)
2πI0(β)
, x ∈ (−π, π]. (15)
where β ≥ 0 determines the dispersion of the distribution, and I0(β) is the modified Bessel
function of the first kind and 0-th order, and x is confined to a support of length 2π in the
vicinity of 0. The use of Tikhonov distributed artificial noise is due to the fact that the Tikhonov
distribution maximizes the entropy when the mean and variance of ejυ (or the circular mean and
circular variance of υ) are specified [20].
Then, the received signal at Alice is given by
rA(t) =
L−1∑
k=0
|hk|ej(2πfkt+(ϕk−θˆk+υk)+θk) + w(t)
=
L−1∑
k=0
|hk|ej(2πfkt+ϕk−∆θˆk+υk) + w(t), (16)
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where t ∈ [tb + δt, tb + δt+ Tf ], and ∆θˆk = θˆk − θk.
With perfect carrier and timing recoveries, sampling the signal with frequency 1
Ts
can obtain
Nf samples for each OFDM symbol, as shown in Section-II.B. After removing Ng samples for
the guard interval, N samples are transformed using FFT to retrieve L parallel channels (without
ISI) at carriers fk, k = 0, 1, · · · , L− 1 as
yk = ρke
jϕk + wk, k = 0, 1, · · · , L− 1 (17)
with ρk = |hk|ej(−∆θˆk+υk) and Var{wk} = γ−1s .
Hence, the received vector in its complex form can be written as
y = [ρ0κ˜0, ρ1κ˜1, · · · , ρL−1κ˜L−1]T +w, (18)
where κ˜k = ej2π
κk
M , k = 0, 1, · · · , L− 1.
E. Verification
To complete the authentication process, Alice requires verifying whether the response signal y
is from Bob or not. If the response signal is not from Bob but Eve (an impersonation attacker), it
is assumed that Eve generates a length-L M-ary random vector KE for authentication as there is
no information about KB available to Eve. Essentially, this is cast as a binary hypothesis testing
problem [21]:
H1 : Kt = KB
H0 : Kt = KE (19)
where Kt denotes the acknowledged key.
The optimum binary hypothesis testing was formulated in [16], which is difficult to solve in
general. Instead, we propose to use the test statistic
ζ = |η|2, η = K†By, (20)
where x† denotes the conjugate transpose of x. Then, ζ is compared to a threshold value ι for
making a final decision.
In both hypotheses, η is the sum of L dependent identically-distributed random variables,
which could be approximately regarded as normally distributed for large L from the central limit
theorem, especially when the dependence among random variables is weak 2. Hence, ζ = |η|2
2The use of i.i.d. artificial noise over time in ANA-PHY-PCRAS makes the dependence among random variables weaker.
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is noncentrally chi-squared distributed with 2 degrees of freedom, the pdf of which can be
expressed as
fζ(x) =
1
σ2Hi
e
−x+λ
σ2
Hi I0
(
2
√
xλ
σ2Hi
)
, (21)
where E{ζ} = σ2Hi + λ and Var{ζ} = 2σ2Hi(12σ2Hi + λ) under hypothesis Hi, i = 0, 1. In [22], it
was shown that λ and σ2Hi can be estimated from the moments of ζ as
λ =
√
2E2{ζ} −E{ζ2},
σ2Hi = E{ζ} − λ. (22)
We point out that the use of |K†By| for verification makes ζ unchanged for any random
but constant phase rotation among all subcarriers. Therefore, the estimate of phase differences
∆θk0 = θk − θ0, k = 1, · · · , L− 1 between subcarriers in PHY-PCRAS [16] is simply replaced
by the direct estimate of subcarrier phases θk, k = 0, 1, · · · , L−1. Even if the receiver oscillator
may introduce a random but constant phase rotation among all subcarriers, it does not pose a
challenge for practical implementation if there is only one single oscillator in the receiver for all
subcarriers. Furthermore, there is no stringent requirement on a common time reference between
users due to the use of noncoherent metric, which is in sharp contrast to the secret generation
approach proposed in [23].
F. Modified ANA-PHY-PCRAS for Time-Separated Subchannel Allocation
Consider the time-separated subchannel allocation scheme shown in Fig. 2. With a total of
J time slots (tm, m = 0, · · · , J − 1), a key can be divided into J sub-keys, namely, KB =
[KT0 , · · · ,KTJ−1]T , and each sub-key can be delivered through L′ carriers.
When Alice challenges at J time instants tam, m = 0, 1, · · · , J − 1 with L′ subcarriers for
each time instant, Bob extracts L′ subcarrier phases at each time instant, and responds to Alice
at time instant tbm with a tagged signal containing the m-th sub-key Km. Finally, the received
signal at Alice during t ∈ [tbm + δt, tbm + δt + Tf ] in a base-band complex vector form can be
written as
y(tm) = e
jθo(tm) · [ρ0(tm)κ˜0, · · · , ρL−1(tm)κ˜L−1]T +w(tm),
where θo(tm) denotes a random but constant phase due to the receiver’s oscillator during t ∈
[tam, tbm + Tf ], and ρk(tm) = |hk|ej[−∆θˆk(tm)+υk(tm)].
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For the robustness of implementation, we always assume that θo(tm), m = 0, 1, · · · , J − 1 are
independently random variables over (−π, π], which means that channel phase discontinuity is
observed over far-separated time slots. Hence, this discontinuity at different time slots should be
seriously considered for verification, and a noncoherent combining method is preferred. Here,
we propose a suboptimum hypothesis testing method, which employs a noncoherent combining
metric
ζ =
J−1∑
m=0
|ηm|2 , ηm = K†my(tm). (23)
With sufficient separation in time, ηm’s are independent complex Gaussian variables of the
same variance. The sum of squares of J independent complex Gaussian variables of the same
variance is noncentrally chi-squared distributed with 2J degrees of freedom, which yields the
pdf of
fζ(x) =
1
σ2Hi
(x
λ
)J−1
2
e
−x+λ
σ2
Hi IJ−1
(
2
√
xλ
σ2Hi
)
, (24)
where both λ and σ2Hi can be again estimated from the moments of ζ as shown in (22).
The cumulative distribution of ζ can be described by the generalized Marcum Q-function,
which is given by
Fζ(x|Hi) = 1−QJ
(
λ
σ2Hi
,
x
σ2Hi
)
, i = 0, 1 (25)
with QJ(a, b) =
∫ +∞
b
(
x
a
)J−1
2 e−(x+a)IJ−1(2
√
ax)dt.
The authentication is typically claimed if ζ ≥ ι. The threshold ι of this test is determined for
a false acceptance rate (or false alarm probability) Pf according to the distribution of ζ |H0
ι = argmax
ι′
QJ
(
λ
σ2H0
,
ι′
σ2H0
)
≤ Pf . (26)
The successful authenticate rate (or detection probability) can be simply computed as
PD = QJ
(
λ
σ2H1
,
ι
σ2H1
)
. (27)
Compared to ANA-PHY-PCRAS, the use of (23) results in noncoherent combining loss for the
modified scheme, which, however, does not require the assumption of phase continuity among
different time slots.
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III. PRACTICAL ISSUES WITH NONIDEAL OFDM TRANSMISSION
A. Practical Issues
For a practical OFDM receiver, there is often a local carrier frequency oscillator for demodula-
tion, with which the received radio signal can be converted from radio frequency into baseband.
Then, the baseband signal is sampled and discrete-time samples are obtained for subsequent
processing, where the sampling clock is derived from a local oscillator. Practically, both timing
and carrier references are asynchronous between the transmitter and receiver. Hence, in a real-
world passband transmission system, the following parameters can cause disturbances in the
receiver.
1) The carrier frequency oscillator for demodulation at the receiver can be different with
the transmitter oscillator, resulting in a carrier frequency offset of ∆f and a random but
constant phase offset of Φ0.
2) The sampling time at the receiver has a constant symbol offset ε = nεTs compared to the
transmitter time.
3) The sampling time at the receiver has a sampling clock frequency offset of ς = (T ′s−Ts)/Ts
compared to the transmitter time, where the sampling period T ′s employed at the receiver
is deviated from the desired sampling period Ts.
For simplicity of notation and in order to focus on the pure imperfections at the receiver, we do
not include the artificial noise in this section, which, however, is fully considered in simulations.
B. The Effect of Carrier Frequency Offset
Whenever the condition 1) occurs, the received samples can be written as
rn = r((n+Ng)Ts) =
∑
i
αis(tn − τi)ej(2πn∆fTs+Φ0) = ejΦ0
∑
k
xkhke
j2πn k+ϑ
N , (28)
where ϑ = ∆fTu, and Ng∆fTs is included in Φ0 for convenience. As the multipath channel is
assumed to be constant during at least one OFDM symbol, we simply use αi instead of αi(t)
for the ith path gain.
After the removal of guard interval from the received samples, the application of FFT yields
yk = e
j2π(ϑN−1
2N
+Φ0)
sin(πϑ)
N sin(πϑ
N
)
hkxk + ik + wk, (29)
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where
ik = e
j2πΦ0
∑
l 6=k
ej2π((l−k+ϑ)
N−1
2N ) sin(πϑ)
N sin(π(l−k+ϑ)
N
)
hlxl (30)
denotes the interchannel interference (ICI). Due to the use of noncoherent metric (23) for
verification, the extra phase 2π(ϑN−1
2N
+ Φ0) has no impact.
It should be noted that with the presence of carrier frequency offset, the direct loss in SNR
is − log 10
(
sin(πϑ)
N sin(piϑ
N
)
)
dB and the frequency offset noise power due to the introduction of ICI
ik can be approximated by [24]
σ2i ≈
π2
3
(∆fTu)
2 (31)
for the normalized channel gains, namely, E {|hk|2} = 1.
C. The Effect of Sampling Offset
With a non-zero symbol offset ε = nεTs, the channel impulse response “seen” by the receiver
is also shifted in the time scale by ε, which yields
hε(τ, t) = h(τ − ε, t− ε) =
∑
i
αi(t− ε)δ(τ − τi − ε) ≈
∑
i
αi(t)δ(τ − τi − nεTs). (32)
since αi(t) is assume to be constant during at least one OFDM symbol. Just like in (7), the
equivalent channel gain at the kth carrier can now be written as
hεk(tn) =
∑
i
αi(tn)e
−j2πk τi+nεTs
Tu = hk(tn)e
−j2πnεk/N . (33)
With a time-shift of nεTs, the input samples for demodulation are also shifted by nε, which
results in both intersymbol interference (ISI) and ICI. The ISI arises since one OFDM symbol
window with a nonzero shift nε 6= 0 will actually be covered by two OFDM symbols, while ICI
is due to the corruption of orthogonality among subcarriers when nε 6= 0. Hence, by neglecting
a minor loss (N−nε
N
) in SNR for large N , demodulation of the subcarrier via FFT yields [24]
yk = e
j2π(k/N)nεhkxk + ik + wk, (34)
where ik is the disturbance caused by both ICI and ISI. The disturbance can be well approximated
by Gaussian noise with power [24]
σ2ε ≈
∑
i
|αi(t)|2
(
2
∆εi
N
−
(
∆εi
N
)2)
, (35)
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where
∆εi =


nε − τiTs , nεTs > τi
τi−Tg
Ts
− nε, 0 < nεTs < −(Tg − τi)
0, otherwise
(36)
With a challenge-response process, ANA-PHY-PCRAS involves two rounds of communica-
tions. Hence, the receiver imperfections from both Alice and Bob should be considered together.
Let naε , nbε be the normalized sampling symbol offsets of Alice’s and Bob’s receivers, respectively.
When Alice challenges, Bob estimates the channel phase at subcarrier fk. With the sampling
symbol offset nbε, this phase estimate must include an extra increment over frequency, namely,
θˆk = θk + 2πn
b
ε ·
lk
N
+ θek, (37)
where θek is the non-biased estimation error with zero mean, and lk = l0 + k∆ℓ.
When Bob responds to Alice, Alice also introduces her sampling symbol offset naε , and she
can finally manage to obtain L parallel channels at subcarriers fk, k = 0, · · · , L− 1 as
yk = ρke
jθεej(ϕk+k̟) + ik + wk, k = 0, · · · , L− 1 (38)
where ̟ = 2π(naε−nbε) · ∆ℓN , θε = 2π(naε−nbε) · l0N , ρk = |hk|e−jθ
e
k and ik denotes the interference
due to the sampling offset naεTs at Alice.
D. The Effect of Sampling Clock Frequency Offset
With a sampling clock period of T ′s, the received samples at t′n = (n+Ng)T ′s can be written
as
rn , r(t
′
n) =
∑
i
αis(t
′
n − τi) =
∑
i
αi
∑
k
xke
j2π k
Tu
((n+Ng)T ′s−Tg−τi)
=
∑
i
αi
∑
k
xke
j2π k
N [n(1+ς)+Ngς−
τi
Ts
]
=
∑
k
(
xke
j2πk
Ngς
N
)
hke
j2πn k+kς
N . (39)
Demodulation of the subcarrier yields [24]
yk = e
j2πk(
Ngζ
N
)ej2π(ϑ
′ N−1
2N
) sin(πϑ
′)
N sin(πϑ
′
N
)
hkxk + ik + wk, (40)
where ϑ′ = kς and ik is the disturbance caused by ICI.
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Consider a sampling clock frequency offset up to ±100 ppm (ς = 10−4) for an OFDM system
of N = 2048 subcarriers. The multiplicative factor sin(πϑ
′)
N sin(piϑ
′
N
)
results in some loss in SNR, which is
less than 0.3 dB in the worst carrier. The sampling frequency offset also results in an incremental
phase rotation over subcarriers, which is the same to (38).
E. Verification under Practical Imperfections
With a challenge-response approach, we focus on the final verification in the response stage.
As depicted in Section-III.C, an equivalent frequency offset due to sampling offset at the stage
of challenging should be considered.
By including all the above imperfections, the demodulated subcarrier at fk is given by
yk = e
j(k̟+φ0)hkxk + ik + wk, (41)
where
̟ = 2π
(naε − nbε)∆ℓ+Ngς + (N − 1)ς/2
N
, (42)
φ0 = π∆fTu(N − 1)/N + 2π(naε − nbε)l0/N + Φ0, (43)
and ik is the disturbance caused by both ICI and ISI.
Consider the modified ANA-PHY-PCRAS for the time-separated subchannels. With the chan-
nel model (41) under practical imperfections, we propose to employ a refined non-coherent
combining metric
ζ = max
̟
J∑
m=1
∣∣K†mΛ(̟)y(tm)∣∣2 , (44)
where Λ(̟) = diag(1, e−j̟, e−j2̟, · · · , e−j(L−1)̟), and J time slots starting at tm, m = 0, 1, · · · , J−
1 are employed. Compared to (23), the refined metric includes the effect of residual frequency-
offset (42) due to various imperfections.
For the Scenario. 1 with ∆ℓ = 128, we have that ∆ℓ
N
= 1
16
, which can result in a very
large frequency offset (42) even with a small value of |naε − nbε|. Therefore, the search of
frequency shown in (44) should be seriously considered in practice. Noting that the contribution
of Ngς+(N−1)ς/2
N
in (42) due to sampling clock frequency offset is minor compared to sampling
offset.
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IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, security analysis is presented. For ease of analysis, we focus on the basic
ANA-PHY-PCRAS over a single OFDM symbol.
A. Noncoherent Channel Model for Eavesdropping
As a passive attacker, Eve only monitors all frames inside the network during authentication,
and tries to learn (KA,KB) from whatever it gets.
By monitoring the response signal from Bob, the received signal at Eve is given by
rE(t) =
L−1∑
k=0
|h˜k| cos
(
2πfkt+ (ϕk − θˆk + υk) + θ˜k
)
+ wE(t), (45)
where h˜k = |h˜k|ejθ˜k , θ˜k is Eve’s channel-phase response when Bob transmits a zero-phase
sinusoidal signal at frequency fk, θˆk is Bob’s estimate of channel response θk when Alice
challenges, and wE(t) is the noise process observed by Eve.
Due to the orthogonality among different subcarriers, one can retrieve the discrete signal vector
from (45) as zL−10 = [z0, · · · , zL−1]T , where
zk = |h˜k|ejψkejϕk + wk, (46)
and ψk = (θ˜k − θˆk) + υk.
For security analysis, we focus on the key equivocation or the conditional equivocation about
the key, namely, H(KB|zL−10 ). As
H(KB|zL−10 ) = H(KB)− I(zL−10 ;KB), (47)
where I(X ; Y ) denotes the mutual information between two random variables X and Y , it
is equivalent to compute the mutual information I(zL−10 ;KB) or its bound. If I(zL−10 ;KB) ≤
δH(KB), it follows that H(KB|zL−10 ) ≥ (1− δ)H(KB). Hence, the successful probability for an
eavesdropper to guess the key is about 2−(1−δ)|KB |. In the ideal case of I(zL−10 ;KB) = 0, we have
that H(KB|zL−10 ) = H(KB), which means that the successful probability for an eavesdropper
to guess the key is about 2−|KB|, the same as a random guess. Whenever I(zL−10 ;KB) = 0,
information-theoretic security is ensured.
With a noncoherent metric for verification, the shared key KB is essentially conveyed in
the differences of modulated phase sequence ϕL−10 . This means that we are interested in the
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noncoherent channel model of (46), where the mutual information I(zL−10 ;KB) is determined by
the sequence of phase differences {∆ψk = ψk − ψk−1}Lk=1, but not on ψ0. To be more rigourous
for security analysis, we always assume that Eve has the complete knowledge about the channel,
which means that ∆θ˜k = 0 (as it can be perfectly compensated by Eve). Since ∆ψk = ∆θ˜k −
∆θˆk +∆υk, we have that ∆ψk = −∆θˆk +∆υk, or
ψk = −θˆk + υk + λ, (48)
where λ denotes an unknown but constant phase rotation over the subchannel index k. Here, λ
is often assumed to be uniformly distributed over (−π, π].
B. Information-Theoretic Security under Independent Parallel Fading Channels
For wireless rich-scattering fading channels, the observations of Eve remain independent from
the channel-specific observations of Alice and Bob, if Eve is located more than half a wavelength
away from these two users [17], [25]. In this case, Eve cannot get a feasible estimate about θk
based on the monitoring signal when Alice initiates a challenge. Hence, it is fair to assume that
Eve has no any knowledge about either θk or θˆk.
Lemma 1: Let θ1, θ2 ∈ (−π, π] be two random variables on a circle and θ = θ1+θ2 mod 2π,
where θ ∈ (−π, π]. If θ1 is uniformly distributed over (−π, π] and θ2 is independent of θ1, it
follows that θ is also uniformly distributed over (−π, π], which is irrespective of the distribution
of θ2.
Proof: Let fθ1(x), fθ2(x), fθ(x) denote the pdfs of θ1, θ2, θ, respectively. For a uniformly
distributed random variable on a circle, we have that fθ1(x) = 12π if x ∈ (−π, π], zeros otherwise.
Since θ2 is independent of θ1, it follows that
fθ(x) =
∫ π
−π
fθ1(t)fθ2(x− t)dt =
1
2π
∫ π
−π
fθ2(x− t)dt =
1
2π
for x ∈ (−π, π].
If the L parallel fading channels at subcarriers fk, k = 0, 1, · · · , L − 1 between Alice and
Bob are independent, we have that either θk or their estimates θˆk, k = 0, · · · , L − 1 are i.i.d,
each of which is uniformly distributed over (−π, π]. Since Eve’s channel phase response θ˜k is
independent of θˆk and by noting Lemma 1, it is clear that ψk, k = 0, 1, · · · , L− 1 (48) are also
i.i.d and uniformly distributed over (−π, π]. This means that
I(zL−10 ;KB) = 0. (49)
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Therefore, there is no hope for Eve to extract any reliable information about the key KA. In this
case, information-theoretic security can be perfectly ensured.
C. Equivocation Analysis for Static Parallel Channels
The worst case for the purpose of authentication is to consider the scenario, where the L
parallel channels between Bob and Alice (or Eve) are all assumed to be static over a long
period. This means that θk can be well estimated before the start of authentication and further
compensated in (48) by Eve, who may get a clean version of the received signal
zk = |h˜k|ej(ϕk+υk+λ) + wk, k = 0, 1, · · · , L− 1. (50)
As Eve can be located very close to Bob, her observation may be free of noise, which is the
worst case for addressing the security issue. In this case, Eve can directly extract the phase of
zk, namely,
φk = ϕk + υk + λ, k = 0, 1, · · · , L− 1 (51)
where φk = ∠(zk).
Hence, the mutual information between zL−10 and KB can now be computed as
I(zL−10 ;KB) = I(φL−10 ;ϕL−10 ) = EφL−1
0
,ϕL−1
0
log2
p(φL−10 |ϕL−10 )
p(φL−10 )
, (52)
where
p(φL−10 |ϕL−10 ) =
∫
λ
p(φL−10 |ϕL−10 , λ)p(λ)dλ
=
∫
λ
∏
k
fυ(φk − ϕk − λ)p(λ)dλ
=
I1
(
β
√(∑L−1
k=0 cos(φk − ϕk)
)2
+
(∑L−1
k=0 sin(φk − ϕk)
)2)
[2πI0(β)]
L
(53)
with I1(x) denoting the modified Bessel function of the first kind and 1-th order. Since ϕk’s are
uniformly, i.i.d. over the discrete values,
p(φL−10 ) =
∑
ϕL−1
0
∈ΩL
p(φL−10 |ϕL−10 )P (ϕL−10 ), (54)
where P (ϕL−10 ) = 1ML for equally-distributed M-PSK constellations.
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Lemma 2: Consider the worst case scenario, where the channel between Alice and Bob is
static and Eve can get a noise-free version of the transmitted signal by either Alice or Bob. With
ANA-PHY-PCRAS, Eve’s key equivocation can be lower bounded as
H(KB|ZL−10 ) ≥ L · Eϕ,υ
[
log2
∑
ϕ¯∈Ω fυ(ϕ+ υ − ϕ¯)
fυ(υ)
]
(55)
if the introduced artificial noise is with the pdf of fυ(x).
Proof: It was shown in [26] that
I(φL−10 ;ϕ
L−1
0 ) = I(φ
L−1
0 ;ϕ
L−1
0 |λ)−
[
I(λ;φL−10 |ϕL−10 )− I(λ;φL−10 )
]
= I(φL−10 ;ϕ
L−1
0 |λ)− I(λ;φL−10 |ϕL−10 ), (56)
where I(λ;φL−10 ) = 0 as {λ + ϕk}L−1k=0 is independent of λ, and the first term I(φL−10 ;ϕL−10 |λ)
denotes the coherent mutual information. By assuming a coherent channel model of φ = ϕ+ υ,
it can be efficiently computed as
1
L
I(φL−10 ;ϕ
L−1
0 |λ) = I(φ;ϕ)
= Eφ,ϕ log2
p(φ|ϕ)
p(φ)
= Eφ,ϕ log2
p(φ|ϕ)
1
M
∑
ϕ¯∈Ω p(φ|ϕ¯)
= log2M −Eφ,ϕ
[
log2
∑
ϕ¯∈Ω p(φ|ϕ¯)
p(φ|ϕ)
]
= log2M −Eϕ,υ
[
log2
∑
ϕ¯∈Ω fυ(ϕ+ υ − ϕ¯)
fυ(υ)
]
. (57)
By noting that I(φL−10 ;ϕL−10 ) ≤ I(φL−10 ;ϕL−10 |λ), the conditional equivocation can be bounded
as
H(KB|ZL−10 ) = H(KB)− I(ZL−10 ;KB)
≥ L · Eϕ,υ
[
log2
∑
ϕ¯∈Ω fυ(ϕ+ υ − ϕ¯)
fυ(υ)
]
, (58)
which could be strictly positive for a properly chosen distribution fυ(x).
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. An Application Model for Getting the Shared Keys
In developing ANA-PHY-PCRAS, we have assumed that Alice and Bob share two secret keys,
namely, {KA,KB}. In practical wireless network scenarios, it is interesting to investigate how
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{RAND,AUTN}
RES 
Alice
(UE)
Bob
(eNB)
User Authentication Request
User Authentication Response
RES=f2K(RAND)
 Verify AUTN
and Compute RES
Compare RES with XRES
MAC=f1K(SQN || RAND || AMF)
AUTN=SQN AK || AMF || MAC?
Fig. 4. A Typical Challenge-Response Authentication Process.
Alice and Bob can share secrets before authentication. This, indeed, depends on the underlying
wireless network.
For 4G mobile networks, we consider a typical scenario where a user equipment (UE/Alice),
wants to authenticate with an evolved Node-B (eNB/Bob). The possibility of sharing common
secrets between Alice and Bob comes from the long-term secret key (K) stored on the Universal
Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) and in the Authentication Center (AuC). The challenge-
response authentication process can be depicted in Fig. 4. As shown, a pair of shared keys
{KA,KB} can be derived from the long-term key K, namely,
KA = f2K(RAND),
KB = f1K(SQN||RAND||AMF), (59)
where RAND, SQN, AMF can be considered as random numbers, and f1, f2 are the message
authentication function used to compute MAC and RES (XRES), respectively. Please refer to
[27] for more details.
B. Simulation Scenario
Consider that the system operates at carrier frequency of 1.9 GHz with a bandwidth of W =
20 MHz, which is divided into N = 2048 tones with a total symbol period of 108.8 µs, of
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which 6.4 µs constitutes the CP. Hence, Ng = 128 and Nf = N + Ng = 2176. N = 2048
parallel subchannels are obtained using both IFFT and FFT. For ANA-PHY-PCRAS, L = 64+1
subchannels with equal bandwidth interval (∆ℓ = 32) are selected with the minimum normalized
correlation of 0.7136 among L subchannels. For the modified ANA-PHY-PCRAS, L′ = 16 + 1
subchannels with equal bandwidth interval (∆ℓ = 128) are selected with the minimum normalized
correlation of 0.2468. To allocate L = L′J sub-channels, we repeatedly employ such L′ carriers
at times t0, t1, · · · , tJ−1, where tj = t0 + j · δT and δT = 10Tc = 48ms can be employed for
example. With the use of large δT , the allocated subchannels at different time slots could be
nearly uncorrelated. However, it should be noted that the use of large δT could cause noticeable
end-to-end delay. In the case of δT = 10Tc = 48ms and J = 4, the end-to-end delay is at least
J · δT = 192 ms, which is comparable to the time delay due to authentication in LTE [27].
In simulations, we employ the channel model with exponentially decaying power-delay profile,
where a total of 20 multipaths are assumed, the normalized delays τ˙i, i = 0, 1, · · · , 19 are
assumed to be uniformly and independently distributed over the length of CP (τ˙i ∈ [0, Ng]),
and στ = 0.5µs. This channel model is comparable to the urban channel defined in [19], with
20 multipaths and maximum delay spread of 2.14µs. The path gains αi(t)’s are assumed to be
complex-Gaussian distributed, which remain constant during one OFDM symbol but varying
independently if the time interval between two OFDM symbols is larger than δT .
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Fig. 5. Probability density functions of Tikhonov distributed artificial noise with different β’s.
For the design of physical layer authentication schemes, one should carefully balance the
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Fig. 6. Normalized equivocation about the key with ANA-PHY-PCRAS.
three performance metrics, namely, the successful authentication rate, the false acceptance rate
and the (normalized) key equivocation 1
L
H(KB|ZL−10 ) for any eavesdropper. In most scenarios,
the ideal Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) (successful authentication rate versus false
acceptance rate) can be achieved without much difficulty in the working SNR region for the
purpose of communications. Hence, the key equivocation, as a security metric, could be of the
first importance for its use in practice.
C. Key Equivocation
We compute the key equivocation for ANA-PHY-PCRAS in the worst case scenario. As shown
in (55), it depends on the specified distribution of artificial noise. Fig. 5 shows the pdfs of the
Tikhonov distributed artificial noise with different β’s. Then, we plot the lower bound (55)
on the (normalized) key equivocation in Fig. 6 for different β’s, with both BPSK and QPSK
constellations. As shown, the key equivocation achieves the maximum at β = 0, in which case the
uniformly-distributed artificial noise over (−π, π] is employed. The key equivocation decreases
when β increases. When no artificial noise is introduced, the key equivocation is simply reduced
to zero for this worst case scenario, which means that there is no guarantee of information-
theoretic security for PHY-PCRAS [16]. Clearly, the use of higher-order modulation scheme can
strengthen the system security as the key equivocation increases.
We comment here that there is simply no guarantee of information-theoretic security for various
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reported physical-layer authentication schemes [6], [7] if Eve is very close to Bob and hence
she can get a noise-free version of the transmitted signal by Bob, and in the same time the
channel between Alice and Bob is unfortunately static over the period of authentication.
D. ROC Performance
Through extensive Monte-Carlo simulations, we investigate the pdfs of ζ under two hypothesis
Hi, i = 0, 1, which can be well employed to evaluate both successful authentication and false
acceptance rates. The proper choice of the threshold ι can also be determined from the pdfs of
ζ .
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Fig. 7. Probability density functions of ζ|H1 and ζ|H0 at SNR = 5 dB for PHY-PCRAS.
1) PHY-PCRAS, ANA-PHY-PCRAS and Modified ANA-PHY-PCRAS: With L = 64 + 1 sub-
channels selected among N = 2048 OFDM subchannels (∆ℓ = 32) for a single OFDM symbol,
Fig. 7 shows empirical pdfs of ζ |H1 and ζ |H0 at SNR=5 dB for PHY-PCRAS, while Fig. 8
shows empirical pdfs of ζ |H1 and ζ |H0 at SNR=10 dB for ANA-PHY-PCRAS with β = 1.5.
In both figures, BPSK constellation is assumed. As claimed in Section-III, ζ |H1 and ζ |H0
are both Chi-square distributed. Hence, Chi-square distributions are also given in both figures,
where |η¯i|, σ2Hi, i = 0, 1 are directly estimated through Monte-Carlo simulations [22]. As shown,
the theoretical Chi-square distributions are coincided well with the empirical distributions even
though L subchannels are correlated. Since the pdf of ζ |H1 is far apart from that of ζ |H0 even
at the SNR of 5 dB in Fig. 7, almost ideal ROC curve can be observed. With the introduction
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Fig. 9. Successful authentication rate versus false acceptance rate at SNR=10 dB for ANA-PHY-PCRAS with different β’s.
of artificial noise, the ROC performance of ANA-PHY-PCRAS is clearly inferior to that of
PHY-PCRAS as indicated by Fig. 8.
Next, we investigate the effect of β on the ROC curves for ANA-PHY-PCRA, which is
depicted in Fig. 9 for different β’s. From both Fig. 9 and Fig. 6, we conclude that there is a
fundamental tradeoff between the ROC performance and security, which is controlled by the
amount of artificial noise (β).
In Fig. 6, we have shown that the use of QPSK constellation is significantly superior to the use
of BPSK constellation for the security of ANA-PHY-PCRAS. Here, we show their ROC curves
February 19, 2016 DRAFT
28
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
False Acceptance Rate
Su
cc
es
sf
ul
 A
ut
he
nt
ica
tio
n 
Ra
te
 
 
QPSK
BPSK
Fig. 10. Comparison of ROC curves with ANA-PHY-PCRAS for both BPSK and QPSK constellations (β = 1.5).
in Fig. 10 for ANA-PHY-PCRAS with both BPSK and QPSK constellations, where β = 1.5 is
used. Noting that the use of QPSK constellation requires the size of key doubled compared to
the use of BPSK constellation. As shown, the same ROC curves are observed for both BPSK
and QPSK. Hence, the use of higher order constellations can significantly improve the security
of ANA-PHY-PCRAS, which is very helpful in practical scenarioes whenever the number of
allocated subchannels is not enough compared to the size of the shared key.
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Fig. 11. Probability density functions of ζ|H1 and ζ|H0 at SNR=10 dB with time-separated subchannel allocation (J = 4)
and β = 1.5.
We also consider the modified ANA-PHY-PCRAS, where L = L′J subchannels allocated for
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four (J = 4) far-separated OFDM symbols with L′ = 16 + 1 subchannels allocated for each
OFDM symbol. Fig. 11 shows its empirical pdfs of ζ |H1 and ζ |H0 at SNR=10 dB and β = 1.5.
Although the modified ANA-PHY-PCRAS can be better protected by the randomness of the
physical channel (due to well-separated subchannels in both time and frequency), it, however, is
slightly inferior to ANA-PHY-PCRAS in the ROC performance as indicated in Fig. 8 and Fig.
11, due to noncoherent combining loss.
2) The effect of practical imperfections: We consider practical imperfections in both the
challenge and response stages. Imperfects at the receiver of Bob in the challenge stage are
assume to be independent from the receiver of Alice in the response stage.
In simulations, both the effects of carrier frequency offset and sampling offset are considered,
while the sampling frequency offset is not considered, as its effect can be well included in the
equivalent channel model as shown in (41). The residual carrier frequency offset ϑ = ∆fTu is
assumed to be uniformly distributed in [−ϑmax, ϑmax]. The sampling offset nε is also uniformly
distributed in [−nmaxε , nmaxε ]. By referring to (44), the verification should be searched over the
range of ̟, due to the sampling offsets introduced by the receivers at the sides of both Bob and
Alice. Clearly,
̟ ∈ [−̟max, ̟max], ̟max = 2π × 2n
max
ε ∆ℓ
N
(60)
With a step size of 2π 2̟max
Nw
for search of ̟, there are Nw candidate frequencies to be tested
for maximizing ζ (44).
In Fig. 12, the modified ANA-PHY-PCRAS is considered for J = 4, nmaxε = 10,∆ℓ = 128,
ϑmax = 0.1 and β = 1.5. Clearly, ̟ ∈ 2π × [−0.625, 0.625]. One can show that the SNR loss
[24] due to both carrier frequency offset and sampling offset is negligible when the working
SNR is 10 dB, which was verified by extensive simulations.
By comparing Fig. 12 with Fig. 11, there is actually minor difference between the scenarios
of zero- and non-zero sampling/carrier frequency offsets for the empirical pdfs when Nw is set
to 200. Even with Nw = 40, it still works with slightly degraded ROC performance. Therefore,
the number of candidate frequencies to be tested can be very small for authentication, and the
increase in complexity due to the search of frequency can be well controlled.
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Fig. 12. Empirical probability density functions of ζ|H1 and ζ|H0 at SNR=10dB (J = 4) and β = 1.5.
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Fig. 13. Comparison of the proposed ANA-PHY-PCRAS and PHY-CRAM for ROC curves at SNR=5 dB and L = 64.
E. Comparison with PHY-CRAM
As a mutual physical challenge-response authentication scheme, the PHY-CRAM proposed
in [6] was shown to be simple, low complexity, robust, and flexible. Hence, it is interesting to
compare ANA-PHY-PCRAS with PHY-CRAM.
Fig. 13 shows the comparison result in the ROC performance at SNR=5 dB, where β = 1.5
is used for ANA-PHY-PCRAS. Therefore, a normalized key equivocation of 1
L
H(KB|ZL−10 ) ≥
0.491 can be achieved in the worst case scenario. This, however, is not true for PHY-CRAM. Even
with the introduction of artificial noise, ANA-PHY-PCRAS is still better than PHY-CRAM in
February 19, 2016 DRAFT
31
the ROC performance as shown in Fig. 13. Indeed, PHY-CRAM employs amplitude modulation,
which is often worse than phase modulation in performance. For implementation, high peak
fluctuations may occur with PHY-CRAM, due to the employment of amplitude modulation.
Hence, it requires to suppress the high peak in practice with additional complexity. ANA-PHY-
PCRAS, however, is more sensitive to the frequency offset compared to PHY-CRAM.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel ANA-PHY-PCRAS for practical OFDM transmission, where
the Tikhonov-distributed artificial noise is introduced to interfere with the phase-modulated key
for resisting potential key-recovery attacks. Thanks to the introduced artificial noise, the proposed
ANA-PHY-PCRAS was proved to be secure even in the worst case scenario, where a static
channel between Alice and Bob is assumed, and Eve can even get a noise-free version of the
transmitted signal by either Alice or Bob.
Various practical issues are addressed for ANA-PHY-PCRAS with OFDM transmission, in-
cluding correlation among subchannels, imperfect carrier and timing recoveries. The effect of
sampling offset was shown to be significant for the practical implementation of ANA-PHY-
PCRAS, and a search procedure in the plane of frequency should be seriously considered for
verification even with very small sampling offsets. We also proposed a modified ANA-PHY-
PCRAS for time-separated subchannels, which shows its robustness in verification whenever the
local oscillator at the receiver may change over time.
Compared to the traditional challenge-response authentication scheme implemented at the up-
per layer, we conclude that ANA-PHY-PCRAS (or its modified version) can be further protected
by the uncertainty from both the wireless channel and introduced artificial noise, which is of
information-theoretic nature and could not be broken even with unlimited computational power.
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